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Trust and the regulation of pharmaceuticals:
South Asia in a globalised world
Petra Brhlikova1†, Ian Harper1†, Roger Jeffery1*†, Nabin Rawal2, Madhusudhan Subedi2 and MR Santhosh3
Abstract
Background: Building appropriate levels of trust in pharmaceuticals is a painstaking and challenging task, involving
participants from different spheres of life, including producers, distributors, retailers, prescribers, patients and the
mass media. Increasingly, however, trust is not just a national matter, but involves cross-border flows of knowledge,
threats and promises.
Methods: Data for this paper comes from the project ‘Tracing Pharmaceuticals in South Asia’, which used
ethnographic fieldwork and qualitative interviews to compared the trajectories of three pharmaceuticals
(Rifampicin, Oxytocin and Fluoxetine) from producer to patient in three sites (north India, West Bengal and Nepal)
between 2005-08.
Results: We argue that issues of trust are crucial in reducing the likelihood of appropriate use of medicines. Unlike
earlier discussions of trust, we suggest that trust contexts beyond the patient-practitioner relationship are
important. We illustrate these arguments through three case studies: (i) a conflict over ethics in Nepal, involving a
suggested revised ethical code for retailers, medical representatives, producers and prescribers; (ii) disputes over
counterfeit, fake, substandard and spurious medicines, and quality standards in Indian generic companies, looking
particularly at the role played by the US FDA; and (iii) the implications of lack of trust in the DOTS programmes in
India and Nepal for the relationships among patients, government and the private sector.
Conclusions: We conclude that the building of trust is a necessary but always vulnerable and contingent process.
While it might be desirable to outline steps that can be taken to build trust, the range of conflicting interests in
the pharmaceutical field make feasible solutions hard to implement.
Background
In conducting our research tracing three pharmaceuti-
cals (Rifampicin, Fluoxetine and Oxytocin) from produc-
tion to consumption in South Asia we became
increasingly interested in participants’ concern with
‘trust’ as a key feature of how different stakeholders
related to the pharmaceuticals industry. We turned our
attention to how a lack of trust was a key problem in
ensuring that these drugs were appropriately produced,
stored, distributed, prescribed and consumed. We
understand trust ‘in rational or calculative terms, as a
form of confidence based on incentives, rules, or institu-
tional features that gives one person reason to believe
that another person will protect his or her interests’ [[1]:
1133]. Most analyses of trust in the health sphere focus
on the dyadic practitioner-patient relationship and gen-
eralised trust of patients in health care providers and
systems (see [2] for a review). This approach has a long
history: much of the classic literature around the ‘pro-
fession of medicine’ - for example the work by Talcott
Parsons - explores why doctors inspire trust (in his
view, because they have the imprimatur of science, long
training producing an esprit de corps, and an ethical
code that protects patients) [3]. Arrow pointed to the
placebo effect:
It is a commonplace that the physician-patient rela-
tion affects the quality of the medical care product....
That purely psychic interactions between physician
and patient have effects which are objectively indis-
tinguishable in kind from the effects of medication is
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evidenced by the use of the placebo as a control in
medical experimentation [[4]: 951].
Note two aspects of this approach:
a. a focus on individual patients and practitioners,
with little attention paid to the wider context;
b. a generalisation from the physicians’ viewpoint,
and their claim of the benefits to patients if they
trust physicians.
The argument has been extended to consider a physi-
cian’s trust in a patient in the context of drugs with a
potential for abuse (e.g., [5]). However, interpersonal
trust in practitioner-patient relationship is also depen-
dent on the availability and quality of health services [2].
Gilson [6] follows Giddens [7] in noting that although
complex public health systems require generalised or
disembedded trust (trust in complex social systems and
institutions following sets of rules, norms, laws and cus-
toms) these trust relationships are also ‘rooted in the
inter-personal relationships that regularly affirm its
affective bases. In other words, the micro and the
macro-levels of trust are interconnected’ [[6]: 361].
Because ‘systems’ are disembedded from local contexts
and personal relations [8] and because self-interested
individuals might be tempted to misrepresent and lie
despite the rules and norms [[9]: 389, referring to [10]],
ensuring sufficient trust presents a challenge. Many of
these arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, in India and
in Nepal. But here, as in some other parts of the world,
physicians face additional complications in sustaining
the trust of their patients, because there are state-sanc-
tioned competitors - trained and practising Ayurveda,
Unani, Siddha or combinations of these with so-called
‘allopathic’ medicine - outside the control of the profes-
sional associations and regulatory bodies that deal with
cosmopolitan medicine [11,12].
Trust can be built when others - not directly involved
in a relationship or situation - attest to the trustworthi-
ness of actors or groups of actors, as well as when
actors themselves behave in ways that appear to be dis-
interested. But Mechanic lists several reasons for a
declining trend of trust in medical institutions in the US
and also in the UK: the influence of television and other
media on public opinion, the fragmentation of commu-
nity, the widespread dissemination of information on
political and other violations of public trust, the restruc-
turing of the economy, and the increase in health care
provision by for-profit institutions, which present medi-
cine as a marketplace and view patients as consumers
[13]. Many of these processes are also visible in India
and Nepal, but they impinge upon a system that started
with less public confidence and greater reasons for mis-
trust. But there is a lacuna in this literature, relating to
the need to consider the fact that, increasingly,
disembedded systems cross national boundaries and
resemble global assemblages ‘through which global
forms of techno-science, economic rationalism, and
other expert systems gain significance’ [[14]: 3]. How
these global processes impact on local trust relationships
is one key element of this paper (see Figure 1 for a gra-
phical representation of these relationships).
Trust is fragile because negative events are more visi-
ble, they carry greater psychological weight, and they are
perceived to be more credible [[12], referring to [15]].
Reporting of negative events raises doubts and feelings
of insecurity about the incentives and behaviour of med-
ical practitioners. Furthermore, the reporting of scandals
but not ‘good practice’ gives the impression that
untrustworthy behaviour is normal and pervasive [16].
Similar issues of trust arise with respect to the regula-
tory framework that is supposed to ensure that new
drugs are safe and efficacious, and that effective phar-
macovigilance will alert patients and practitioners to
new health threats. There is a danger of ‘industry cap-
ture,’ if ‘the pharmaceutical industry influences the per-
spective of the regulatory agency-so it comes to adopt
their interests over and above those of patients’ [[17]:
1498]. But if the industry is not seen as a unitary force,
but rather one riven by conflicting interests as well as
(on occasion) brought together in support of the indus-
try as a whole, we need to ask which sectors of the
industry are most successful in gaining regulatory sup-
port. In focusing on trust relationships involved in the
regulatory frameworks that affect all sectors of pharma-
ceutical supply chains - frameworks and agencies that
are supposed to ensure that all medicines are safe, effec-
tive and produced to specified quality standards, and to
enforce standards for drug distribution, marketing and
promotion - we note the potential for conflict as well as
co-operation amongst these agencies and institutions,
rather than focusing just on those dealing with the
approval of new chemical entities.
Trust, then, is a much more general issue in health
systems and in pharmaceuticals supply chains in parti-
cular than has so far been addressed. Although there is
a bewildering array of stakeholders concerned with
pharmaceuticals in any country (Figure 2 represents
those we have identified in India, for example) we focus
on those most central to our interests. We should note
that, for most retailers and wholesalers we spoke to, the
specific significance of pharmaceuticals - that they are
dangerous if misused or kept, handled or distributed
without attention to the appropriate standards - are not
of key concern for them as businessmen and women.
The pharmaceuticals market in South Asia
The Indian pharmaceuticals market is growing fast, and
it is set in one of the most complex health systems in
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the global South - ranging from ‘5-star’ hospitals offer-
ing cutting edge surgery to medical tourists as well as
the local elite, to run-down clinics and health centres
that function barely at all, and are surrounded by
unqualified practitioners who prescribe a full range of
treatments, often from several systems of medicine.
India is an increasingly significant pharmaceuticals mar-
ket, although the vast majority of pharmaceuticals avail-
able in India are already off patent, and generics are
likely to dominate the market for the foreseeable future
[18]. By contrast, Nepal has a small and struggling pro-
duction sector, and elite provision is truncated. But in
both countries, the pharmaceuticals market is saturated
with ‘branded generics’.
In the simple models popular with industry analysts,
the Indian and Nepal drug distribution systems have
only four or five layers: pharmaceutical manufacturers;
clearing (or carrying) and forwarding agents [CFAs]/
depots/super stockists; stockists; wholesalers; and retai-
lers. These models also define only a small number of
routes through which drugs flow. The main difference
for Nepal is the absence of the layer of CFAs, super
stockists or depots.
On closer analysis, this neat picture breaks down. Esti-
mates vary dramatically as to the numbers within each
of these categories, suggesting that the boundaries are
not clear-cut. In India, estimates of production compa-
nies varies from over 20,000 - widely quoted but rarely
substantiated - to 5,000 who are ‘active’ producers. The
numbers of CFAs or super-stockists are rarely given,
and numbers seem likely to change quite quickly, since
the roles reflect tax and licensing conditions rather than
Regulatory agenciesPharmaceutical industry
Trust/mistrust
Confidence 
Competition
Information
Foreign MNCs
Indian small-
scale producers
Indian MNCs
WHO
US FDA
DCGI 
(GoI)
Media and internat. 
organisation reports 
Consumers
?
?
Figure 1 Key relationships affecting trust in pharmaceutical products in India
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real economic need. Estimates of 60,000 stockists and
500,000 and 600,000 pharmacists in 2000-2005 are
based on figures supplied by the All-India Organisation
of Chemists and Druggists [19-21]. Industry sources
claim that retailers account for about 70-80 per cent of
the pharmaceuticals sales in the country, with the
remainder being sold directly through hospital pharma-
cies [22]. In rural and small-town India (accounting for
25-35 per cent of the market) private medical practi-
tioners (whether formally trained or not) often stock
most of the medicines they expect to prescribe [23].
Most small hospitals and nursing homes also have in-
house pharmacies and many require patients to buy the
drugs on the premises, whether they are in- or out-
patients. Finally, there are far more who earn a living by
prescribing the products of the globalised pharmaceuti-
cal industry than the Medical Council of India [MCI]
figure of 668,131 for physicians in 2006 [24].
The large-scale companies that produce the active
pharmaceutical ingredients are relatively few: most
small-scale producers merely produce formulations. But
the boundary between the two kinds of companies is
not clear-cut. Small companies often act as additional
producers for large companies, formulating drugs and
packaging them with the name of the large company, on
‘loan licences’ or contracts that allow them to
manufacture a product of another party. In such cases
drugs are exactly the same as those produced in fac-
tories owned by the large producer. Loan-licensing or
sub-contracting may avoid excise duty or sales tax, or
allow the large producer to take advantage of the small-
scale producer’s ability to pay lower wages, with lower
social welfare payments and other costs.
The distinction between retailer/pharmacist and prac-
titioner is also often unclear: in much of Nepal and the
Indian countryside (and also in smaller towns) patients
commonly approach a pharmacist or retailed and
receive a diagnosis and medicines (often including
powerful prescription drugs) without the intervention of
any other kind of practitioner [25]. Similarly, in most
small towns and villages, practitioners also dispense the
medicines they prescribe without charging a consulta-
tion fee. Finally, once medicines have reached a patient,
they are not necessarily consumed by that person.
Rather, the portion unconsumed may be passed on, sold
or traded with other patients; and prescriptions may
have a life of their own, generating further drug pur-
chases either for the original patient or for someone else
entirely [25,26].
India and Nepal’s drugs distribution systems can,
then, be described as ‘unregulated’:
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context: The Public 
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Task Network:
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Figure 2 The organizations involved in pharmaceutical regulation in India, and their contexts, adapted from [60]
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(a) Unlicensed individuals and/or entities trade in
drugs that they are not authorized or entitled to
deal with or in contravention of the applicable
laws, regulations and norms; or (b) Licensed
individuals and/or entities trade in drugs that
they are not authorized or entitled to deal with
or in contravention of the applicable laws, regu-
lations and norms [[27]: 1-2].
This lack of regulation is experienced - to a greater or
lesser extent, depending on people’s position in the sup-
ply chain and their social, economic and cultural capital
- as a pharmaceuticals market that must be treated with
excessive caution. Individual patients cannot always
trust that those who prescribe drugs are qualified to do
so (nor that their prescriptions are motivated by the
best interests of the patient, rather than the pecuniary
interest of the prescriber). Doctors and other prescribers
do not feel confident about the quality of many of the
companies producing drugs - generic or patented - that
they give or sell to their patients. For many years, public
sector hospitals and clinics have either supplied no med-
icines at all, or have provided low cost generic
unbranded medicines which have been subject to regu-
lar scare stories concerning their efficacy and safety; yet
patients have often been asked to pay for these nomin-
ally free medicines [23]. Retailers do not always trust
companies to supply good quality products at fair prices,
and producers do not trust retailers to pay on time or to
give their products a fair opportunity in the market-
place. Producers offer retailers financial inducements to
substitute their own products for those that may have
been prescribed by a doctor or other prescriber: prac-
tices like this are well known and further undermine
trust in other parts of the system [23,25,28]. Few of the
stakeholders trust the regulators who are charged with
ensuring that the relevant rules are followed. In all these
cases, the local mass media tend to enhance feelings of
distrust by publishing horror stories of corruption,
counterfeit medicine or of the risks of unqualified
practitioners.1
Project Design and methods
’Tracing Pharmaceuticals in South Asia’ was designed to
integrate the insights of discussions in anthropology of
global assemblages and in political economy of global
commodity chains; and by integrating ‘bottom-up’ and
‘top-down’ approaches to the local and global contexts
through specific case-studies.2 We selected three key
generic drugs (Oxytocin, Rifampicin and Fluoxetine) on
the basis of our prior knowledge of patterns of use in
three regions of South Asia (Nepal, West Bengal and
Uttar Pradesh). The selected drugs provided contrasting
patterns of production, distribution, marketing and retail
sales, reflecting, for example, Rifampicin’s central role in
the Indian and Nepali vertical TB programmes, com-
pared to the more peripheral role of the state in the
cases of Oxytocin and Fluoxetine. Our existing knowl-
edge suggested high levels of informal and unregulated
use of each of these drugs, which impinge on different
global strategies for health, with different priorities for
action. While the three drugs provided contrasting
insights into many aspects of supply chains, they pro-
vided similar information on the role played by trust
and mistrust in the overall pharmaceuticals context.
Through semi-structured interviews with people
throughout the production chain, with representatives of
donor agencies, government personnel and some obser-
vation of particular settings (such as TB clinics and
maternity wards) we established a clear picture of these
pharmaceuticals in use. We now turn to three case stu-
dies that demonstrate how issues of trust intervene
within relationships in the medicine supply chains in
India and Nepal. These case studies were selected to
illustrate processes at different points in the supply
chain, and area examples where we were able to draw
upon evidence from a variety of viewpoints to contex-
tualise and triangulate our argument. Whereas in some
areas - such as prescribers’ trust in particular pharma-
ceuticals companies and their products - trust relation-
ships are strong and regularly reinforced through gift-
giving, social events, and medical representatives’ activ-
ities, in these cases (and others) trust is threatened,
undermined or regularly needs to be renegotiated and
re-established.
Case Study 1
Responses to a suggested revised ethical code in Nepal
In July 2007 the Government of Nepal released its
Guidelines on the Ethical Promotion of Medicines
through its Department of Drug Administration [DDA].
While acknowledging that the industry is run as a busi-
ness, the Director of the DDA noted that this raised
ethical issues. In particular concern was raised over
costs to patients, and that the giving of ‘bonuses’ to
retailers to stock particular brands had increased3; and
that substitution of prescribed brands for others has
been pushed by producers, driven by the systemic giving
of discounts and free samples of medicines.
In response to the release of these guidelines there
was widespread protest and resistance from several key
organisations representing different positions in the
chains of distribution and prescribing (see Table 1).
Pharmacists, retailers and wholesalers, medical represen-
tatives, producers and the medical profession all
responded in ways that eventually made the implemen-
tation of the Guidelines impossible. Most respondents
bemoaned the lack of consultation over the development
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of the Guidelines. In a complex institutional network
like pharmaceuticals, each set of representatives found
reasons to blame others for any identified ethical pro-
blem. Sets of vested interests developed responses to the
guidelines, making it difficult to know who to trust as
accusations and rebuttals were publicised.
For the Nepal Chemists and Druggist Association
[NCDA], the main problem was the attack on the bonus
system. The NCDA reacted immediately and lobbied
hard for the guidelines to be withdrawn, otherwise retai-
lers and wholesalers would no longer make profits, leav-
ing the companies unscathed. The NCDA argued that
the volume of drugs being sold would remain the same,
and that the drug companies would never lower prices
to compensate for this. In their view, the benefits of
stopping bonuses would be transmitted directly, and
unfairly, to the producers.
Medical Representatives [MRs] were aggrieved that the
guidelines named them as a specific problem as the
channel for ‘gift’ giving. MRs argued that this was
because they had no official status and that if they were
registered with the DDA, they would be better regu-
lated, and such ethical problems would not arise. For
the MRs, the dispute offered an opportunity to escape
from a target system that linked their pay levels directly
to sales. They argued that the companies pushed them
to visit retailers, for example, and this encouraged
unethical practices; if they were less accountable to the
companies and more to the government of Nepal, they
could resist such pressures.
For the Nepal Medical Association [NMA], the pro-
blem of bonus giving did not lie with the medical pro-
fession, but with retailers and manufacturers. A leading
member of the NMA said that if doctors take gifts from
companies, responsibility lies with the companies, not
the doctors. He argued that doctors trust a company
because of their personal experience of the quality of its
products, not in return for any gifts they might receive:
’Some doctors might have very good relationship
with the specific companies, brand and products.
They might trust one specific company based on
their own experience and not because of the gift and
other benefits. Other people could say that Dr. X is
getting advantage from the company Y so that he/
she prescribes that specific brand. This might not be
true...
The issue of why doctors and pharmacists choose one
company’s products over another lay behind the
responses of many of them to accusations that they did
so for their own financial gain. For example, a psychia-
trist prescribes the anti-depressant fluoxetine naming
the ‘multinational’ brands (by which he meant Indian
Table 1 Stakeholders in the conflict over ethical codes for retailers in Nepal
Organisation Main Objectives Membership Website address
Department of Drug
Administration
(DDA)
’To regulate all functions relating drug like misuse
and abuse of drugs and its raw materials, to stop
false and misleading advertisement and make
available safe, efficacious and quality drug to the
general public by controlling the production,
marketing, distribution, sale, export-import, storage
and use of drugs’.
Government department http://www.dda.gov.np/
Graduate
Pharmacists’
Association of Nepal
(GPAN)
The ‘overall development of pharmacy as a
profession with the motto, ‘Profession of Pharmacy
for Better Health Care’.’
’Non-governmental, non-
profitable, non-political and fully
professional organization of
pharmacists’
http://gpan.com.np/
Nepal Chemists and
Druggists
Association (NCDA)
’Enforcing the price uniformity of drugs within the
country’
’Non-governmental organization
of pharmaceutical trade
professionals’ (retailers and
wholesalers)
http://www.dda.gov.np/ncda.php
Nepal Medical and
Sales Representative
Association (NMSRA)
’Establishing state-defined professional values’;
‘Eliminating the anti-national practices and
domination by foreign companies in labor and
business’; and ‘helping by all possible means the
state mechanism to ensure access to quality health
for all’
Trade Union for Medical
Representatives
http://nmsra.org.np/client/index.php
Nepal Medical
Association (NMA)
’To uplift and preserve the professional standard,
values and freedom of the NMA’; ‘carry out
academic activities...’; and ‘...improve the health
status of the people’.
’Non-governmental professional
organisation of the Nepalese
medical doctors’
http://www.nma.org.np/
Association of
Pharmaceutical
Producers of Nepal
(APPON)
’Facilitation of Nepalese Pharmaceutical Industries
to achieve standard par international & to be
Globally Competitive.’
Pharmaceutical companies http://www.appon.org/
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branded drugs) rather than Nepali ones so that he can
be sure of ‘quality’. If a patient fails to respond to his
treatment regime, his first thought is to the quality of
the compound, rather than to suspect the validity of his
original diagnosis. At the main teaching hospital in
Kathmandu, psychiatrists are trained to prescribe brand
name drugs, rather than writing generic names, with the
rationale that in the market place, and with increasing
numbers of brands coming and going, this was the best
way to be sure of the quality of the drugs. In one hospi-
tal a pharmacist in charge of the hospital pharmacy, on
discussing the question of trusting the system that pro-
cured TB drugs in Nepal, seemed to trust only his own
empirical experience of the outcomes of patients, not
the government programme nor the international pro-
curement process.
In addition, patients themselves tend to want certain
brands, and one pharmacist explained that while he
would like to substitute, he cannot, as patients refuse.
Another said that in light of increasing competition, and
substitution practices, local people trust him rather than
the drugs per se. A retailer denied that he practised sub-
stitution:
’I think that is an immoral practice, and I don’t do
that here. Our customers trust us and that is why
they come here. For my patients, if I do not have a
particular brand, we provide them through our
friends... I don’t give substitutes.’
This retailer blamed the DDA and the government’s
failure to regulate: but he also rejected the specific pro-
posed guidelines. Blame was regularly laid at the govern-
ment’s door by retailers and by others in the chain. The
president of the Association of Pharmaceutical Produ-
cers of Nepal linked the gift and bonus giving to the
increase in competition in the market. But he defined
the problem with the lack of a regulatory framework
and the government, rather than with the producers.
Another Nepali producer stated that without controlling
the situation of bonus giving in India, there was little
point in attempting to prevent the issue in Nepal alone.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, none of the participants in
the system reflected analytically on what the patterns of
gift-giving in the supply chain mean to the participants.
In South Asia, as in the USA, there is a ‘three-way gift
cycle occurring in the medical marketplace between
reps, doctors, and patients’ that provides a context for
building trust in what is otherwise a trust-destroying
situation [[29]: 327]. ‘The actual everyday pharmaceuti-
cal economy is based on social relationships that are
forged and strengthened through repetitive and calcu-
lated acts of giving’ [[29]: 332, emphasis in the original].
A key issue, then, in the attempted regulation of drugs
in Nepal - made manifest through the release and
responses to the ethical guidelines on drug promotion -
is that the government has lost its capacity to inspire
trust in its regulatory processes. As a result, trust in
whether or not a drug works tends to become depen-
dent on individual relationships - between patients and
specific retailers, or doctors and particular companies -
rather than in the system itself. Different actors are,
then, not against regulation per se, but ask for different
kinds of regulation, depending on their particular defini-
tion of why there is an absence of trust.
Case Study 2
Disputes over ‘counterfeit’ medicines and quality control
in India
The possibility that a medicine might not be all that it
seems is clearly a potential source of mistrust. Patients
and prescribers cannot easily tell from a package what it
contains, and whether it will fulfil the promise of cure
or relief of symptoms: they need to trust the disem-
bedded mechanisms that are designed to assure quality,
prevent fraud and obviate the need for further enquiries.
But such judgements are not made entirely with refer-
ence to a particular packet or pill: they are framed by
local, national and international discourses about spur-
ious and counterfeited medicines and the quality stan-
dards applied to Indian producers.
Media reports, both globally and within India itself,
claim that India is one of the top five sources of coun-
terfeit drugs [30,31].4 Representatives of multinational
and large Indian companies regularly put forward accu-
sations that the extent of counterfeiting in India is sub-
stantial, dangerous to the public and leading to large
losses for legitimate producers. In 2002, a submission
from the Confederation of Indian Industry [CII] to the
2003 ‘Expert Committee on a Comprehensive Examina-
tion of Drug Regulatory Issues, Including the Problem
of Spurious Drugs’, chaired by Dr R A Mashelkar,
claimed that the WHO had estimated that
’35% of fake drugs produced in the world come from
India, which has a Rs. 4,000 Crore spurious drug
market. About 20% of medicines in the country are
fake or sub-standard. Of these, 60% do not contain
any active ingredient, 19% contain wrong ingredients
and 16% have harmful and inappropriate ingredients’
[[32]: 76].
But the CII failed to provide the Mashelkar committee
with evidence to support its claims, and the WHO
denied ever having produced a study with the results
attributed to it [[32]: 76-7]. These Indian pharmaceutical
companies’ unsubstantiated claims seem to be the sole
source cited by IMPACT, a body dominated by large
Brhlikova et al. Globalization and Health 2011, 7:10
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pharmaceuticals companies but associated with the
WHO [33]. The 2005 European Commission statistics
[34] that 75 per cent of the cases of counterfeit medi-
cines seized on the EU borders originated from India
has been widely cited [see, e.g., [35]]. By 2007, however,
only 35 per cent of medicines seized by the EU and
treated as counterfeit came from India, while medicines
originating in Switzerland comprised 39 per cent of the
total - but this statistic has not been widely cited [36].
According to the PSI the extent of counterfeiting var-
ies dramatically by drug, with Viagra accounting for a
sizeable proportion [31]. There is some limited (and not
very reliable) evidence for how far this applies in India.
A study published in 2007 was based on an attempted
random collection of 10,743 samples, of which 23 per-
cent were deemed prima facie suspect, but only 8 of
these samples (0.3 percent of the original drugs col-
lected) failed an assay test [37].5 A Government-spon-
sored survey in 2009, based on a model provided by the
Indian Statistical Institute, tested 24,136 samples of 61
popular brands from nine therapeutic categories, finding
the prevalence of spurious drugs at 0.046 per cent [38].
In several articles, Roger Bate has drawn attention to
substandard drug seizures in India, and to his own
small-scale studies (in one, of five medicines from 52
pharmacies; in another, a total of 720 samples were pur-
chased). In a response to the Government-sponsored
survey mentioned above, he cast scorn on the claim
that its authors had no useful information about
areas known for counterfeit drugs. This is inconcei-
vable: New Delhi’s Bhagirath Palace and certain mar-
kets in Agra and Aligarh are known to me, a
foreigner, as major locations of the fake drugs trade
[39].
The CII agenda seems to be to draw a clear line
between the respectable, safe, large producers and the
myriad of small and medium enterprises, and thus to
establish trust in the big Indian companies and enhance
their export potential. But perhaps, as Delhi’s then dep-
uty drug controller said in 2001, ‘Fake drugs are not
Delhi’s problem’ and ‘a lot of the times it is just old
brand rivalry. The big fish cannot bear to find smaller
chaps coming out with similar medicines so they say
‘spurious, duplicate, &c.’ [40]. In other words, the larger
companies are trying to generating mistrust in the pro-
ducts of their generic competitors, in order to charge
higher prices for their more ‘reliable’ drugs. This mes-
sage is supported by leading doctors, as became clear in
our interviews. Medical College Professors repeatedly
told us that some companies (usually, but not always,
the market leader) were the only producers that could
be trusted; they pass this attitude onto their students,
affecting their prescribing practices after they graduate.
In the absence of any pharmacological evidence of dif-
ferences in the same drugs produced by different produ-
cers, we conclude that these processes of inter-company
competition lead to many consumers paying more for
their drugs than they need to, and for many more to be
confused and lacking in faith in the cheaper drugs that
they take.
The strategy of the larger producers has helped to
generate a climate in which their own claims to be
above suspicion have also been challenged. India has the
highest number of production facilities approved by the
US Food and Drugs Administration [FDA] outside the
US. In 2001, Schedule M of the Drugs and Cosmetic
Act, 1940 (specifying requirements on manufacturing
facilities of allopathic drug producers) was amended to
comply with FDA and WHO current Good Manufactur-
ing Practice [cGMP] standards and was mandatory by
2003. Large companies complied, but some smaller
companies that focus on domestic markets were unable
to reach the new standards. They are being squeezed
out by the combination of the workings of the trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights [TRIPS]
within the World Trade Organisation [WTO], intensi-
fied competition and these more stringent cGMP stan-
dards. Of the 5877 manufacturing units with drug
manufacturing licenses in 2002, only around 400 com-
plied with WHO cGMP requirements, of which 300
were large scale units [32].
Despite the adoption of stricter production standards
the credibility of Indian drug regulatory authority is
being challenged by US and European regulators. In
2008 WHO threatened to de-recognise Indian national
regulatory authorities for failing to impose cGMP stan-
dards at three public vaccines producers. Such de-recog-
nition would have had severe implications for Indian
exports. Thus, like other developing countries with weak
regulatory capacities struggling with low capacity [41],
India faces a trade-off between the implementation of
stricter rules and viability of local production (at least in
the context of small-scale producers). Indian regulators
are ambivalent: coming down hard on smaller producers
might (after a lag) raise the trustworthiness of all Indian
producers abroad, but at the cost of considerable disrup-
tion of supplies to the domestic market, and a rise in
prices. Similarly, the larger companies face a dilemma:
to portray others as producers of counterfeit drugs may
weaken the position of smaller producers internally, but
damage the overall image of India as a drug producing
country. The outcome of these contradictory pressures
is delays in the strict enforcement of the specified rules.
Confidence in the FDA’s regulatory processes was
questioned in 2008, when 62 deaths were associated
with Baxter’s heparin products in the US. Baxter
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imported contaminated heparin from China, from a
company that was not cGMP certified. The same year a
report revealed important shortcomings in FDA records
about importers and about inspections visits of their
facilities as well as a low number of inspections carried
out abroad that are not repeated on a regular basis [42].
To improve oversight of foreign facilities in two key
source-countries of pharmaceuticals, FDA offices were
established in India (in January 2009) [43] and in China.
Before the India office was opened, Ranbaxy’s Dewas
and Paonta Sahib plants were inspected by the FDA.
Ranbaxy is one of the largest Indian generics producers,
with a substantial share of its exports. The FDA ‘has no
evidence of harm to any patients who have taken drugs
made in these two facilities’ [44]. Nonetheless, it issued
Warning Letters and a further letter identifying devia-
tions from US cGMP requirements, such as possible
cross-contamination of drug production, and of sterile
processing arrangements observed during visits by two
investigators, or in the reports of surveillance proce-
dures [45]. In the case of Paonta Sahib, the first
reported concern was that:
Written records of major equipment cleaning and
use are inaccurate and do not provide assurance that
persons double-checked the performance of equip-
ment cleaning, because there is no assurance that
those persons responsible for determining that work
was performed were present at the time of equip-
ment cleaning [[46]: 2].
The FDA followed up these Warning Letters with an
Application Integrity Policy [AIP] letter to Ranbaxy,
which charged that:
These and other findings indicate a pattern and
practice of submitting untrue statements of material
fact and other wrongful conduct, which raise signifi-
cant questions regarding the reliability of the data
and information contained in applications (pending
and approved) that your firm has filed with the
Agency [47].
Our point here is not whether pharmaceuticals pro-
duced by these plants were or were not dangerous or
sub-standard, or were at enhanced risk of being so.
Rather, the example shows that the credibility of pro-
duction and record-keeping standards at Indian factories
are negotiated globally. In protecting US consumers and
re-establishing trust in FDA’s regulatory processes there,
the FDA also undermined trust in Indian producers
within India. The Indian regulatory body was again por-
trayed as insufficiently stringent in monitoring produc-
tion facilities under their jurisdiction.
The larger Indian companies are ambivalent about
moves like this: on the one hand, they wish to show
that they can meet the highest international standards,
and to export their products to profitable overseas mar-
kets. But they suspect that their overseas competitors
use regulatory bodies to hinder Indian companies’ access
to overseas markets. As the chief executive of an Indian
generics company told us:
We won our case against GSK [GlaxoSmithKline] in
2005 on their drug for asthma and de facto we
could market our product in the UK in 2006. It is
now 2009 and we don’t have permission. But they
keep pointing out the deficiencies in the product
and they keep asking us to do new things. It’s a
question of delay. So if you are blocking us on
patents you are also blocking us on regulations. [2
November 2009]
Such companies also recognise that reports of deci-
sions such as the denial of recognition by the FDA of
Ranbaxy’s products continue to undermine the credibil-
ity of all Indian producers. Thus the circulation of accu-
sations and rumours about production standards and
regulatory failures leads to lack of trust in all Indian
products abroad, complementing and reinforcing a lack
of trust within the country as well.
Case study 3
Trust in the DOTS programmes in India and Nepal
Both Nepal and India have adopted the central tenets of
the Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course [DOTS]
programme for their government-run TB programmes.
Based on five core elements - political commitment;
sputum microscopy; short-course chemotherapy, includ-
ing the direct observation of treatment; an uninter-
rupted supply of drugs and finally, recording and
reporting systems [48]. Much has been written on trust
- or lack of it - in relation to the direct observation
component in that there seems to be little trust of either
the patient [49] or to the patient ’s family members
[50,51] with direct observation as core component. In
this case study, we broaden out the question of trust in
the provision of TB services, to include the companies
that provide the drugs and how this resonates with
understandings of trust in the private sector.
In 1997, an estimated 50 percent of tuberculosis cases
in India were treated-partly or completely-in the private
sector [52]. Private physicians we interviewed in India
frequently complained that the government run TB ser-
vices were flawed in a number of ways. Some of these
criticisms focused on the choice of government regimen
itself - and that it was based on an intermittent treat-
ment, not daily therapy; or that the categories of
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treatment were sub-optimal (particularly the so-called
retreatment regimen, which added just one drug to the
others and could further stimulate drug resistance) for
example. However, criticism also focused on a general
lack of trust of government services: patients would not
trust free services, we were told, and patients would
often rather pay for services to avoid government clinics.
Issues included patient waiting times, that services are
not flexible, and that the services are best only for the
poor. For example, one Kolkata private practitioner said
‘if a patient can afford the medicine I don’t send them’,
echoing a general sense that the DOTS programme was
really only for the poorest of patients. Lack of trust in
government service was a central component of these
criticisms.
Meanwhile, those workers involved in the public sec-
tor and the development and provision of DOTS ser-
vices saw the availability and provision of medicines in
the private sector as a particular problem for TB con-
trol. Valued at $94 m, 74 per cent of the of TB drugs
sales were in the private sector in 2006 [53]. Our review
of CIMS in March 2007 revealed 36 companies in India
producing Rifampicin products; 19 in uncombined form
and the following range of fixed dose combinations
[FDCs]; 34 in combination with isoniazid; 12 with iso-
niazid and ethambutol; 19 with isoniazid and pyrazina-
mide; and 19 with the four drugs together. When we
combined the data from three listings the total number
of producers marketing a range of single and combined
drugs went up to 52 (though in several cases, a single
firm - such as Cadila and Wockhardt - markets drugs
under two or even three names). The seven companies
listed by IMS with the highest sales figures in 2006
were: Lupin Labs. (45.4 per cent) Macleods Pharma
(19.7 per cent), Novartis (6.5 per cent), Shreya Life-
science (4.9 per cent), Cadila Pharma (4.7 per cent),
Concept Pharma (4.5 per cent), Wockhardt (2.5 per
cent), Themis Medicare (2.2 per cent). Each produces a
different range of FDCs that feed into this intensely
competitive local market. This wide availability of com-
binations might contribute to confusion about the cur-
rently-regarded appropriate treatment regimes. In 1989,
in a study of Mumbai slums, researchers found that 100
private practitioners had prescribed 80 different - mostly
inappropriate and expensive - drug regimens to their
patients with pulmonary tuberculosis [51]. In Lucknow
in 2007, a survey of 141 physicians treating TB patients
found large proportions (up to 70 per cent for some
items) either over-prescribing or under-prescribing anti-
tuberculosis drugs, with private practitioners wrong
more often than those in the public sector [54].
This situation was described as ‘therapeutic anarchy’
by one WHO official we interviewed. He saw the exis-
tence of many drugs of unknown quality as a major
obstacle to controlling TB, and as a major concern for
the rise of resistant strains of TB [MDR-TB] [see also
[55]]. However, public health practitioners tended to
characterise the bigger companies - particularly Lupin -
as behaving more ethically, and being more trustworthy
than the smaller ones. They blamed a range of practi-
tioners, from village doctors and ‘quacks’, to the medical
representatives of smaller companies promoting their
products unethically. In short, they suspected the com-
mercial interests of smaller companies and those of
medical practitioners, and this confirmed for them the
need for centralised policies and regimens.
The implications of these trust related issues - not
around patients, but of companies and their products -
remain uncertain. Most government programmes now
procure their drugs internationally, from WHO pre-qua-
lified sources. Thus the India and Nepal national tuber-
culosis programmes procure their drugs, not directly
from the drug companies, but through the Global Drug
Facility (GDF) procurement mechanism, housed by the
WHO. It is a mechanism to ‘promote standardization’
and ‘offer assured high-quality TB drugs and cheaper
prices’. Its ‘mandate is to contribute to the realization of
the TB-related Millennium Development Goals and to
the eventual elimination of TB through the provision of
timely, quality assured and affordable anti-TB medicines
and related supplies’ [56]. Publicly procured drugs in
both India and Nepal are provided via this mechanism,
and the companies supplying this are dominated by
Indian companies and include Lupin, Cadila, and
McLeods. DOTS programmes cannot buy their drugs
directly from companies, because funding of the buying
of drugs is linked to the Global Fund [GF] policy. The
GDF is ‘a trusted partner for such major funding bodies
as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria’ [57]. In short, countries who want to purchase
their drugs using GF money have to use this source.
Thus even though national programmes order their
drugs increasingly through internationally trusted
sources, the lack of trust of government services remains
a problem (but is rather unrelated to drug procurement
and distribution). Drug availability in DOTS is high in
both India and Nepal, but the quality of services, waiting
time, closing hours, convenience, stigma etc are the
major barriers to wider use of Government DOTS facil-
ities. In India, while three quarters of the sales of TB
drugs by value remain in the private sector, not the
national programme, the problems of the wide range of
treatments provided by individual practitioner will
remain - and will plausibly contribute to more opportu-
nities for MDR-TB to spread. Both sectors, then, contri-
bute to the unmet need for appropriate treatment. How
does trust come in? More trust between the public sec-
tor and the private sector might improve the quality of
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private sector provisions both through regulation and
in-service training. More trust between patients and
government services might reduce costs to patients, pro-
vide more satisfactory care, and more success in getting
patients to follow drug regimens fully. Although consid-
erable efforts have been made by WHO and others to
improve quality control and raise trust in TB drugs,
these efforts address only part of the problem, which
inheres in the low levels of trust by patients in public
sector services in general, and the inability of the public
sector to educate and engage private practitioners
successfully.
Conclusion
In the sphere of medicine and public health, trust is cru-
cial to the successful meeting of important goals - but
current literature focuses too much on trust in patient-
practitioner relationships, and fails to acknowledge the
role of trust in other sectors. Pharmaceuticals produc-
tion, distribution, retail and prescription processes are
part of complex global assemblages, and so issues of
trust permeate not just local and national settings, but
also must be understood in their global contexts. While
in some parts of these assemblages, trust relationships
work in ‘disembedded’ ways, detached from local con-
texts and personal relations and involving generalised
trust, in other parts of the same systems - sometimes
involving the same people - trust may be based on
exactly those personal networks and relationships that
require face-to-face contact in local contexts. While
these different kinds of trust relationships sometimes
work in synergy (as Giddens argues) [7], as often as not
they work against each other.
Lack of trust generates high transaction costs, and in
this paper we have specified the general outlines of
some of those costs - for the health system as a whole,
and for patients in particular - in the pharmaceuticals
markets of India and Nepal. By looking beyond trust in
patient-practitioner relationships - which can too easily
lead to a ‘blaming of the victim’ (or at least a blaming of
the patient who does not follow the practitioner’s
recommendations) - we have cast a wider net. We sug-
gest that issues of mistrust characterise many (if not all)
relationships amongst stakeholders engaged in South
Asia’s pharmaceuticals supply chains. The presence of
competing stake-holders - each of which feels justified
in pursuing its own interests - undermines trust either
within the same or other sections of the health sector.
Each tends to argue that if others would only trust
them, costs (economic, political social or health costs)
would fall. But the failure to achieve some coherence in
attempts to reform the situation points to wider, sys-
temic, problems. Governance reform is not so much
about ‘implementing designs created by committees of
technocrats. Rather, the first order of business is to
restore credibility to the state itself’ [58]. The inability of
the myriad commissions of enquiry appointed by the
Government of India to review pharmaceuticals since
1996 is testimony to the absence of sufficient legitimacy
within the state to achieve such a goal [59], as is the
failure of the Nepal Government to see through its
pharmacy reform measures. Building trust - in a health
system as a whole - is a complex operation, not helped
by international interventions that (at one level) seem to
be about building trust but at other levels work to
undermine it. Where the public health sector is failing
as badly as in India and Nepal, trust and mistrust have
become personalised: motives are continually suspect;
one set of actors rarely praises the trustworthiness of
others; change is resisted tenaciously. And ‘who will reg-
ulate the regulators themselves’ remains a serious
problem.
End Notes
1 See, for example, the scandal over the recognition of
new medical colleges by the MCI, whose Chair Dr
Ketan Desai was forced to resign in April 2010. The
Indian Central Bureau of Investigation requested ‘speci-
fic complaints of money demanded by MCI officials for
giving approval/permission to colleges without requisite
infrastructure or other things’ and had received 154
such complaints in the following month (http://beta.the-
hindu.com/news/article434610.ece). In March 2010, the
MCI asked the Government to penalise drug companies
who offer doctors payments or other benefits (http://
www.pharmainfo.net/og/pharmindia/mci-asks-health-
ministry-make-pharma-cos-punishable-gifting-docs)
2 For more details see the website http://www.csas.ed.
ac.uk/scaffolding/new_page_root/research_projects/
tracing_phramaceuticals.
3 Producers or their medical representatives offer
retailers additional boxes if retailers bought their pro-
duct. In some cases these were ‘buy one, get one free’
but sometimes were more generous.
4 The Pharmaceuticals Security Institute [PSI], one
source of this claim, is linked to the International Fed-
eration of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associa-
tions, whose Director-General serves as the PSI
President.
5 This study used flawed methods of collecting sam-
ples, and therefore cannot be relied on, but the contrast
with the industry estimates is too large to be ignored.
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